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CHAPTER 5 
T'rusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§5.1. Administration of estates: Priority of claims. General Laws, 
c. 198, §1, sets forth an order of preference of claims against insolvent 
decedents' estates.1 Under the wording of the first and last sentences of 
this section, administrative charges, funeral expenses and those of last 
illness are given highest priority. Such expenses are to be abated rat-
ably if assets of the estate are insufficient to satisfy them in full. Despite 
the specific language of the statute, there have been expressions of 
opinion that administrative expenses should take precedence over all 
other claims.2 
This point of view received judicial approval in Lally v. Peter Bent 
Brigham Hospital: 3 " ••• [administration] expenses may be allowed at 
proper intervals as the administration proceeds, since otherwise the 
orderly handling of estates would be impeded if not prevented alto-
gether."4 The Court also pointed out that priority could be indepen-
dently authorized under other statutes providing for the allowance of 
fiduciaries' and attorneys' fees.5 
The specific issue before the Court in the Lally case, however, was 
whether there was any preference between funeral expenses and ex-
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§5.1. 1 "If the estate of a person deceased is insufficient to pay all his debts, it 
shall, after discharging the necessary expenses of his funeral and last sickness and 
the charges of administration, be applied to the payment of his debts, which shall 
include equitable liabilities, in the following order: 
"First, Debts entitled to a preference under the laws of the United States. 
"Second, Public rates, taxes and excise duties. 
"Third, Wages or compensation, to an amount not exceeding one hundred 
dollars .... 
"Fourth, Debts, to an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars, for neces-
saries .... 
"Fifth, Debts due to all other persons. 
"If there is not enough to pay all the debts of any class, the creditors of that 
class shall be paid ratably upon their respective debts; and no payment shall be 
made to creditors of any class until all those of the preceeding class or classes, of 
whose claim the executor or administrator has notice, have been fully paid." 
2 See Newhall, Settlement of Estates §185 (4th ed. 1958); Lombard, 4 Mass. 
Practice Series §744 (1962). 
a 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 475, 257 N.E.2d 447. 
4 Id. at 477, 257 N.E.2d at 449. 
5 G.L., c. 206, §16; G.L., c. 215, §39A. 
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penses of last illness. The Court decided that it could not prefer one 
to the other without "doing violence" to the specific wording of the 
first and last sentences of G.L., c. 198, §1. The degree of violence might 
have been mitigated had the Court analyzed the nature of funeral ex-
penses in the same manner as it dealt with charges of administration. 
The same argument of necessity obtains; that is, there must be a dis-
posal of the corpse.a Moreover, there is the presumption that funeral 
expenses are incurred on the credit of the estate.7 Medical and hospital 
services impose upon the decedent's estate obligations which were debts 
of the decedent in his lifetime.s Such a debt, arising from a voluntary 
act of the decedent, must yield priority to a charge against his estate, 
arising from a duty imposed by law upon the administrators, as is in-
deed the duty of providing the decedent with a decent hurial.9 
§5.2. Charitable trust: Deviation from terms, cy pres. The doc-
trine of cy pres in its orthodox form sanctions the application of trust 
property held for a particular charitable purpose to other similar char-
itable purposes if the donor has also manifested a more general char-
itable objective.1 The courts have been inclined to infer a general 
charitable intent in addition to the particular purpose expressed, es-
pecially if the trust has been in existence for a long time.2 The settlor 
may be expected to anticipate changed circumstances in the future, 
which may render the fulfillment of his specific charitable desires im-
possible or impracticable. And, if he has not expressly provided for a 
termination of the trust with a reverter or a gift over, it would appear 
that he would ordinarily prefer that the property continue to benefit 
the community in some altered manner, rather than have it revert to 
his heirs who may be remote, unknown and numerous.3 Nor should 
the needs of the community be totally irrelevant.4 
A cy pres alteration will not be allowed where the terms of the trust 
unequivocally provide for a termination and a gift over if a specified 
charitable purpose fails. Although the concern for general public ben-
efit may be one of the reasons why the doctrine of cy pres is applicable 
6 See Sweeney v. Muldoon, 138 Mass. 304, 307, 31 N.E. 720, 721 (1885). 
7 John S. Waterman & Sons, Inc. v. Hook, 246 Mass. 522, 141 N.E. 596 (1923). 
8 Hayes v. Gill, 226 Mass. 388, 115 N.E. 492 (1917). 
9 See Hildebrand v. Kinney, 172 Ind. 447, 87 N.E. 832 (1909); Sullivan v. Horner, 
41 N.J. Eq. 299, 7 A. 411 (1886). 
§5.2. 1 Restatement of Trusts Second §399 (1959); 4 Scott, Trusts §399 (3d ed. 
1967). 
2 Rogers v. Attorney General, 347 Mass. 126, 196 N.E.2d 855 (1964), discussed in 
1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.6; Anna Jaques Hosp. v. Attorney General, 341 Mass. 
179, 167 N.E.2d 875 (1960), discussed in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.12; Restate-
ment of Trusts Second §399, comment i (1959); 4 Scott, Trusts §399.2 (3d ed. 1967). 
3 Anna Jaques Hosp. v. Attroney General, 341 Mass. 179, 182, 167 N.E.2d 875, 
878 (1960); Restatement of Trusts Second §399, comment i (1959). 
4 See DiC1erico, Cy Pres: A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 153 (1967). 
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to charitable but not private trusts, the donor's express direction of 
the form of the benefit cannot be completely ignored.5 
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. City of Quincy6 a testator, who 
died in 1869, left property to the city of Quincy to found and main-
tain a school 
. - . for the education of females ... who are native born, born 
I wish it to be understood, in ... Quincy, and none other than 
these, to be allowed to attend this Institute which I wish to be as 
perfect and as well conducted as any other in the state.7 
The will further provided, 
... If ... Quincy refuses to accept the above property upon 
the terms herein specified, or [shall] fail to comply with the words 
and intent of this will, as determined by good judges, or should 
surrender the property or use it for any other purpose than con-
templated in this will, then I bequeath the said property to the 
Trustees of Dartmouth College to be used by them, in the manner 
they may think best, for the promotion of science and literature. 
[Court's emphasis.Js 
Quincy accepted the trust, and the school's first building was con-
structed in 1894. The income of the trust, once sufficient to cover the 
operating costs of the school, had recently fallen far short of the 
amount required to run a quality school. Because of its financial 
difficulties, the school had lost its accreditation. In recent years its 
enrollment has been less than 75 percent of capacity, but if it were 
able to operate at capacity, tuition income could be increased ma-
terially and accreditation would probably be restored. 
In order to obtain additional income to meet the increased costs, the 
school's trustees formulated a plan to admit qualified girls who were 
not Quincy-born, only to fill the space not being used by Quincy-born 
girls. The proposal would require the non-Quincy-born girls to pay 
tuition equal to the cost of their education, so that the income of the 
trust might be used to reduce the tuition of only native-born girls. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed a decree of the probate court 
enjoining the admission of girls not born in Quincy, concluding that 
the enrollment of these girls would not conflict with the "dominant 
intent" of the testator. Dartmouth contended that permitting a devia-
tion from the terms of the trust by allowing non-Quincy-born girls to 
attend the school would be a cy pres application of the trust, and that 
5 See Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General, 340 Mass. 197, 163 N.E.2d 662 
(1960); Harvard College v. Attorney General, 228 Mass. 396, 117 N.E. 903 (1917). 
61970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 809, 258 N.E.2d 745. 
7 Id. at 810, 258 N.E.2d at 747. 
s Id. at 810-811, 258 N.E.2d at 748. 
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the doctrine of cy pres could not be utilized because of the testator's 
gift over to Dartmouth if the school for only Quincy-born girls failed. 
In rejecting this argument the Court observed that the case did not call 
for the traditional application of cy pres principles, since the gift had 
neither failed entirely nor become impossible of execution according 
to the provisions of the will. 
The Court reasoned that the donor's dominant intent was to estab-
lish a quality school for native-born girls, and that the exclusion of 
non-Quincy-born girls was subordinate to that major purpose. Changed 
circumstances over the 75-year period during which the school was in 
actual operation have made necessary or desirable the abandonment of 
certain details of the original plan. Allowing girls not born in Quincy 
to take up the space not filled by the native-born could not harm the 
primary charitable objective. The additional tuition thus obtained 
would make possible the continued achievement of the objective of a 
good preparatory school education for girls born in Quiincy. 
In support of its conclusion, the Court pointed out that there was 
a general reluctance on the part of a court of equity to enforce a for-
feiture of a charitable trust, especially if it had been in operation for 
many years and had become a community asset. The Court observed 
that: 
The justification for allowing a charitable gift to continue 
indefinitely, without regard to the Rule against Perpetuities or 
related rules, is the public benefit from achievement of important 
charitable objectives. The same justification does not necessarily 
apply to subordinate details of such a charitable gift, particularly 
those which tend unduly to restrict adapting use of the gift to 
changing conditions. In some cases, indeed, subordinate provisions, 
originally may have been imposed, not to facilitate the achieve-
ment of a general charitable purpose, but for the personal grati-
fication of the donor in respects wholly irrelevant to any effective 
execution of a public purpose. There is strong ground for dis-
regarding such subordinate details if changed circumstances render 
them obstructive of, or inappropriate to, the accomplishment of 
the principal charitable purpose.9 
§5.3. New legislation: Appraisals. Prior to the 1970 SuRVEY year, 
it was required by law that one or more disinterested persons be ap-
pointed to appraise the items included in the inventory of the estate 
of a decedent.1 Typically, the appraiser designated by the probate 
court was the person suggested by the attorney representing the 
estate. This person was not bound to have, and generally did not have, 
9 Id. at 819-820, 258 N.E.2d at 753. The Court cited 4 Scott, Trusts §399.4 (3d ed. 
1967) and DiClerico, Cy Pres: A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 153, 192-195 
(1967). 
§5.3. 1 G.L., c. 195, §6. 
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any special skill to make property appraisals. He, often perfunctorily, 
swore to the values of inventory items previously ascertained by the 
estate's lawyer. The appraiser was entitled to be compensated for his 
services out of estate assets. 
The appraised values of items in the inventory are binding on no 
one, the inventory's primary function being the basis for future probate 
accountings.2 Recognizing that independent appraisals, with con-
comitant increases in probate expenses, usually performed no useful 
function in probate proceedings, the legislature has changed this 
practice. Under Acts of 1970, c. 317, §:1,3 the fiduciary filing an in-
ventory in the probate court shall himself ascertain the actual market 
values of the property comprised therein, and shall receive no com-
pensation for such appraisal. The act, however, authorizes the probate 
court, upon motion by the fiduciary or any interested person, to ap-
point one or more special appraisers of any or all inventory items, if it 
shall find such appointment to be in the best interests of the estate.4 
§5.4. Other new legislation. Acts of 1970, c. 637, §1, amends 
paragraph (1) of G.L., c. 190, §1, by increasing the intestate share of 
the surviving spouse from "twenty-five thousand dollars," wherever it 
appeared in the paragraph, to "fifty thousand dollars." The elective 
share of the surviving spouse remains unaffected. 
Acts of 1970, c. 119, §1, amends G.L., c. 188, §1, by increasing the 
value of a homestead estate from four thousand dollars to ten thou-
sand dollars. 
Chapter Ill of the Acts of 1970 amends G.L., c. 195, §16, by authori-
zing the niece, nephew, aunt or uncle of a decedent to become a 
voluntary administrator of a small estate. 
~ Acts of 1970, c. 120, §1, amends G.L., c. 204, §3, by affording greater 
flexibility in a local fiduciary's dealings with a foreign fiduciary. It 
authorizes a Massachusetts fiduciary, who has in his hands personal 
property to which a fiduciary appointed in another state is entitled, to 
transfer the property to the foreign fiduciary upon such terms as the 
probate court may decree upon petition filed therefor. 
Chapter 338 of the Acts of 1970 amends G.L., c. 65, §22, by elimina-
ting the penalty for failure to file within the designated period an 
inventory of all property subject to the inheritance tax. 
2 See Hutchinson v. King, 339 Mass. 41, 45, 157 N.E.2d 525, 527-528 (1959); 2 
Newhall, Settlement of Estates §§274, 278-279 (4th ed. 1958). 
3 Amending G.L., c. 195, §6. 
4 Regulations concerning valuations for inheritance and estate tax purposes may 
require appraisals by specialists if the property in question does not have a readily 
ascertainable market value. 
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